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St. Thomas More
The St. Thomas More Project at Yale
University will celebrate the fifth anniversary of its foundation this September. The
past year has seen it enter into a stage of
continuous publication of fourteen volumes
in a series of More's Complete Works. The
final touches have just been put to Volume
11, The History of King Richard III, which
will be available in the bookstores by September 1, and the Project is working now on
Utopia (Volume IV), which went to the
printer in June. The edition of the Utopia
for the series of Selected Works, tentatively
scheduled for simultaneous publication with
the larger volume in the scholarly series,
will be in press sometime this fall. If all goes
well, the Project expects their joint appearance in the summer or fall of 1964. The two
volumes will not, of course compete with
each other. Scholars will want to use the
volume in the OperaOmnia, with its lengthy
introduction by E. Surtz, S.J. and J. H.
Hexter, and its equally full Commentary.
Only this volume will contain the Latin text,
with full apparatus, and the new English
translation in parallel. The version for the
Selected Works, which will also appear in
paperback, is designed for use as a school
text and for the general public. It will contain a brief introduction and a minimal number of notes to the English text. A brochure
describing the above editions along with

subscription blanks may be obtained by
readers from the Yale University Press
at 1986 Yale Station, New Haven,
Connecticut.
It would scarcely be just, however, to give
the impression that the year's work in More
studies has found its major locus in New
Haven. As a matter of fact, 1962-63 has
seen a broad increase in both work on and
interest in St. Thomas More. Many of our
readers may be interested in the foundation,
in Brussels on December 29 of last year, of
the Amici Thomae Mori. This new organization proposes to publish an annual periodical with the title Moreana which will
attempt to cover recent work on More
through articles, reviews, bibliography, and
reports on conferences, etc. The foundation
of the society formed part of the "Quinzaine
Thomas More," organized by the abbg J.
Jacques of Brussels. Mr. E. E. Reynolds is
Chairman, and Mr. L. Martz Vice-Chairman. Secretaries, who are handling subscriptions for the Association, include Mr.
Garry Haupt (1986 Yale Station, New
Haven); Dr. Herbrlggen (Malmedyweg 20,
Miinster in Westfalien); Mr. Trapp (The
Warburg Institute, Woburn Square, London
W.C. 1); and Father Marc'hadour (29 rue
Volney, Angers). Interested readers should
apply to the secretaries for further information.
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Catholic Lawyers Guide
The leading official of the matrimonial
court of the Archdiocese of Detroit has
recently compiled a book entitled Catholic
Lawyers Guide (Catholic Lawyers Society,
Chancery Bldg., 1234 Washington Blvd.,
Detroit, 155 pages, $2).
Lawyers have been blessed and blamed
for any number of things. But the complexity and importance of their work are
beyond argument. All human affairs hinge
on civil or Church law. And all human law
derives from the natural law or divine.
Msgr. Charles Malloy, presiding judge of
the Detroit Tribunal and for many years
chaplain to the Catholic Lawyers Society,
has chosen an appropriate theme for his
guide in using the words of Pope Pius XII
that the jurist moves between the finite and
infinite, the human and the divine, "and in
this . . . lies the nobility of the science which
he professes."
Catholic Lawyers Guide puts within easy
reach of the lawyer the answers to ethical
questions that affect his practice. Msgr.
Malloy includes some pertinent material
from ethics and moral theology, e.g., the
human act, co-operation, oaths, birth control, justice and rights.
Then he examines the moral dimension
of the lawyer in politics, on the bench, and
before the bar. Not only the Catholic lawyer, but every Catholic in politics, must
recognize his serious obligation to observe
the Commandments. Even a heated campaign does not justify calumny or detraction.
Nor do political debts justify the distribution
of public offices to unworthy or incompetent
persons.
Msgr. Malloy gives a lucid explanation of
the Church's own courts, especially as they
concern marriage, and he cautions the

Catholic lawyer against taking divorce cases
of Catholics without prior permission of the
Chancery.
Many other topics fill out Catholic Lawyers Guide-legalfees, wills, the purpose of
a Catholic Lawyers Society (with suggested
by-laws), brief biographies of St. Ives and
St. Thomas More, and in the appendix is a
list of Catholic law schools in the United
States.
Each chapter lists books that are useful
for further study.
The principles can be dug out of other
texts, especially books of ethics and moral
theology. But lawyers, judges and others
connected with the legal profession will find
this manual particularly handy for applying
the principles, clarifying the issues and putting it all between the covers of a single
volume.
Wire Tapping
Readers of The Catholic Lawyer who recall the note on the legal and moral problems posed by eavesdropping which was
published in the Summer 1962 issue may
be interested in a further treatment of the
subject in the May 1963 issue of Friar.In
an article entitled "Listening In: Yes or
No?," Father Damian J. Blaher, O.F.M.,
claims that in connection with wire tapping,
the question is whether the right to privacy,
the right to preserve one's secrets inviolable
is so absolute that it can never be invaded
without injustice, or whether there are times
when it must give way to a superior right
or greater good. Privacy to think one's
thoughts, to have one's secrets free from
the unwarranted intrusion of others is one
of our most cherished rights. It is not just
the "American way of life" or something
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It is far
more basic.
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The moral law condemns without equivocation the stealing of another's secrets and
the unjustifiable invasion of another's mind
just as strongly as it condemns the unjust
taking of another's property. There are
times, however, when the common good, the
good of society as a whole may demand
the sacrifice, within due limits, of one's individual good. When the individual good
and the common good come into conflict the
latter is to prevail, as long as the goods pertain to the same order. There are times when
the individual good may prevail over the
public good, but that is only where the goods
are of a different order, say, spiritual versus
temporal.
Listening to telephone conversations, wire
tapping, eavesdropping in particular cases
may be perfectly legitimate if it is necessary
for the common good, for the welfare of
society as a whole. If wire tapping is necessary to protect the nation from its enemies,
to prevent the commission of crimes such
as the narcotic trade and prostitution, which
are in themselves harmful to the public welfare, then "listening in" could be morally
justified.
To say this, is not to fall into the error of
thinking that everything done by public authority is therefore, by that very act, a matter of the public good. In point of fact, the
right of an individual to privacy and his
right to protect his secrets are basic. In itself
it is a requirement of the public or common
good, and the area in which this right must
be surrendered is extremely limited. Any
easy authorization for wire tapping issued
in the name of the common good would be
quite unreasonable because it would ultimately work against the common good.
Father Damian states further that wire
tapping could be moral and legitimate for
the public authority as a pragmatic solution
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in an existing emergency as long as the
emergency or the need to search exists. The
authority to tap any telephone for any reason would be an unjust and oppressive device destructive of an individual's right to
privacy. Wire tapping without very tight
controls is too treacherous a tool, too dangerous a weapon to thrust into the hands
of any man even on the plea of law enforcement. For that reason any plan to authorize
wire tapping must contain the proper restrictions to keep it from becoming destructive of the rights of individuals.
Private wire tapping by blackmailers, private detectives, business concerns trying to
check the "loyalty" of their employees is
not uncommon. This cannot be justified on
the basis of common good for it has nothing
to do with the public welfare. Wire tapping
practiced by private individuals is illegal and
definitely immoral.
The Prayer Case
An interesting comment on Engle v. Vitale by Dean Erwin N. Griswold can be
found in the June 1963 issue of the New
York State Bar Journal. It is a reprint of
an article originally appearing in the Spring
1963 issue of the Utah Law Review.
In discussing the approach in the case
taken by Justice Black, Dean Griswold
speculates that there has perhaps been some
unfortunate use of nomenclature by commentators on the case. The approach espoused by Justice Black, and followed by
him and some of his colleagues, has, understandably enough, been called the "absolutist" approach. The opposite approach has
been called the "balancing" approach, because it is thought to involve the balancing
of various competing claims to the judge's
attention. Both of these appellations may
well be misleading.
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According to Dean Griswold, the Black
approach might better be called the "Fundamentalist theological" approach. If one
thinks of the Constitution as a God-giving
text stating fixed law for all time, and then
focuses on a single passage, or, indeed, on
two words-"no law"-without recognizing
all the other words in the whole document,
and its relation to the society outside the
document, one can find the answers very
simply. "'No law' means no law." No more
thought is required.
On the other hand, "balancing" may be
a misnomer, to, as a description of the
method followed by those who do not accept
what is called the "Fundamentalist"
approach.
Rather than "balancing," the approach
might better be called the "comprehensive"
or "integral" approach, since it involves
looking to the text of all of the Constitution,
and, indeed, in proper cases, to the "unwritten Constitution," examining and considering fully all relevant texts and conditions of
our constitutional system, and integrating
all together in reaching the ultimate solution.
Instead of focusing on a few words, and
ignoring all else, including the effect and
meaning of those words, as distinguished
from their apparent impact when isolated
from everything else, as the "absolutist"
or "Fundamentalist" approach does, the
comprehensive or integral approach accepts
the task of the judge as one which involves
the effect of all the provisions of the Constitution, not merely in a narrow literal
sense, but in a living, organic sense, including the elaborate and complex governmental structure which the Constitution,
through its words, has erected. Under the
"Fundamentalist" approach, the judge puts
on blinders. He looks at one phrase only;
he blinds himself to everything else. Can

this approach, asks Dean Griswold, really
be preferable or sounder than one under
which the Court examines all constitutional
provisions in a living setting, and reaches
its conclusion in the light of all the relevant
language and factors? Of course, this comprehensive approach requires strong and
able judges. Without judges of high ability,
great character, and staunch courage, our
Constitutional system will surely suffer
under any approach to Constitutional
questions.
Dean Griswold comments further it was
unfortunate that the question involved in the
Engel case was ever thought of as a matter
for judicial decision, that it was unfortunate
that the Court decided the case, one way or
the other, and that this unhappy situation
resulted solely from the absolutist position
which the Court has taken and intimated
in such matters, thus inviting such litigation
in its extreme form.
He expresses two separate lines of thought
in explaining his position. One is the fact
that we have a tradition, a spiritual and
cultural tradition, of which we ought not
to be deprived by judges carrying into effect
the logical implications of absolutist notions
not expressed in the Constitution itself, and
surely never contemplated by those who put
the constitutional provisions into effect. The
other is that there are some matters which
are essentially local in nature, important
matters, but nonetheless matters to be
worked out by the people themselves in
their own communities, when no basic rights
of others are impaired. It was said long ago
that every question in this country tends
to become a legal question. However, he
asks, is that wise? Are there not questions
of detail, questions of give and take, questions at the fringe, which are better left to
non-judicial determination?

9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1963

It is perfectly true, and highly salutary,
that the first amendment forbade Congress
to pass any law "respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." These are great provisions of great
sweep and basic importance. But to say that
they require that all trace of religion be kept
out of any sort of public activity is sheer
invention. Our history is full of these traces;
chaplains in Congress and in the armed
forces; chapels in prisons; "In God We
Trust" on our money, to mention only a few.
God is referred to in our national anthem,
and in "America," and many others of what
may be called our national songs. Must all
of these things be rigorously extirpated in
order to satisfy a constitutional absolutism?
Must we deny our whole heritage, our culture, the things of spirit and soul which have
sustained us in the past and helped to bind
us together in times of good and bad?
Turning to the other point, namely, that
there are some matters which should be
settled on the local level in each community
and should not become Supreme Court
cases, the Dean states:
The prayer involved in the Engel case was
not compulsory. As the Supreme Court itself
recited, no pupil was compelled "to join in
the prayer over his or his parents' " objection. This, to me, is crucial. If any student
was compelled to join against his conviction,
this would present a serious and justiciable
question, akin to that presented in the flag
salute case. The Supreme Court did not give
sufficient weight to this fact, in my opinion,
and relied heavily on such things as the
history of the Book of Common Prayer,
which under various Acts of Parliament,
was compulsory on all.
Where there is no compulsion, what happens
if these matters are left to the determination
of each community? In New York, under
the action of the Regents, this determination
was made by the elected authorities of the
School District. It was, indeed, a fact that

a large number of the School Districts in
New York did not adopt the so-called Regents' prayer. This may have been because
they could not agree to do so, or because
the situation in particular School Districts
was such that all or a majority did agree
that they did not want to have such a prayer
or that it was better to proceed without a
prayer. Where such a decision was reached,
there can surely be no constitutional objection on the ground that it was a decision
locally arrived at, or that it amounts to an
"establishment" of "no religion." But, suppose that in a particular School District, as
in New York Hyde Park, it was determined
that the prayer should be used as a part of
the opening exercises of the school day.
Remember that it is not compulsory. No
pupil is compelled to participate. Must all
refrain because one does not wish to join?
This would suggest that no school can have
a Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag if any
student does not wish to join. I heartily
agree with the decision in the Barnette case
that no student can be compelled to join in
a flag salute against his religious scruples.
But it is a far cry from that decision to say
that no School District can have a flag salute
for those who want to participate if there
is any student who does not wish to join.
This is a country of religious toleration. That
is a great consequence of our history embodied in the First Amendment. But does
religious toleration mean religious sterility?
I wonder why it should be thought that it
does. This, I venture to say again, has been,
and is, a Christian country, in origin, history,
tradition and culture. It was out of Christian
doctrine and ethics, I think it can be said,
that it developed its notion of toleration. No
one in this country can be required to have
any particular form of religious belief; and
no one can suffer legal discrimination because he has or does not have any particular
religious belief. But does the fact that we
have officially adopted toleration as our
standard mean that we must give up our
history and our tradition? The Moslem who
comes here may worship as he pleases, and
may hold public office without discrimination. That is as it should be. But why should
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it follow that he can require others to give
up their Christian tradition merely because
he is a tolerated and welcome member of
the community?
Though we have a considerable common
cultural heritage, there have always been
minority groups in our country. This, I am
sure, has been healthy and educational for
all concerned. We have surely gained from
having a less homogeneous population. Of
course, the rights of all, especially those of
minorities, must be protected and preserved.
But does that require that the majority,
where there is such a majority, must give
up its cultural heritage and tradition? Why?
Let us consider the Jewish child, or the
Catholic child, or the non-believer, or the
Congregationalist, or the Quaker. He, either
alone, or with a few or many others of his
views, attends a public school, whose School
District, by local action, has prescribed the
Regents' prayer. When the prayer is recited,
if this child or his parents feel that he cannot
participate, he may stand or sit, in respectful attention, while the other children take
part in the ceremony. Or he may leave the
room. It is said that this is bad, because
it sets him apart from other children. It is
even said that there is an element of compulsion in this-what the Supreme Court has
called an "indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform." But is this
the way it should be looked at? The child
of a non-conforming or a minority group
is, to be sure, different in his beliefs. That
is what it means to be a member of a minority. Is it not desirable, and educational,
for him to learn and observe this, in the
atmosphere of the school-not so much that
he is different, as that other children are
different from him? And is it not desirable
that, at the same time, he experiences and
learns the facts that his difference is tolerated and accepted? No compulsion is put
upon him. He need not participate. But, he,
too, has the opportunity to be tolerant. He
allows the majority of the group to follow
their own tradition, perhaps coming to understand and to respect what they feel is
significant to them.

Is this not a useful and valuable and educational and, indeed, a spiritual experience for
the children of what I have called the majority group? They experience the values of
their own culture; but they also see that
there are others who do not accept those
values, and that they are wholly tolerated
in their non-acceptance. Learning tolerance
for other persons, no matter how different,
and respect for their beliefs, may be an important part of American education, and
wholly consistent with the First Amendment.
I hazard the thought that no one would think
otherwise were it not for parents who take
an absolutist approach to the problem, perhaps encouraged by the absolutist expressions of Justices of the Supreme Court, on
and off the bench.
Church-State
The argument over Church-State relations as it exists today and as it may very
well break out in the next session of the
Second Vatican Council is a classical Catholic dilemma. On the one side is most of the
weight of authority and tradition, on the

other, the greater cogency of theological
argument. The traditional view is reflected
in papal documents like Leo XIII's Immortale Dei where the following passage
occurs:
As a consequence, the State, constituted as
it is, is clearly bound to act up to the
manifold and weighty duties linking it to
God by the public profession of religion.
Nature and reason, which command every
individual devoutly to worship God in holiness, because we belong to Him and must
return to Him since from Him we came,
bind also the civil community by a like
law. For men living together in society are
under the power of God no less than individuals are and society, not less than individuals, owes gratitude to God, who gave it
being and maintains it and whose everbounteous goodness enriches it with countless blessings. Since then no one is allowed
to be remiss in the service due to God and
since the chief duty of all men is to cling
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to religion in both its teaching and practicenot such religion as they may have a preference for but the religion which God enjoins
and which certain and most clear marks
show to be the only one true religion-it is a
public crime to act as though there were no
God. So, too, is it a sin in the State not to

have care for religion as something beyond
its scope, or as of no practical benefit, or out
of many forms of religion to adopt that one
which chimes in with the fancy; for we are
bound absolutely to worship God in that
way which He has shown to be His will.
All who rule, therefore, should hold in honour the holy name of God and one of their
chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and
sanction of the laws and neither to organize
nor enact any measures that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden duty of
rulers to people over whom they rule.
It is true that in contrast to the traditional
approach, Pope Pius XII spoke up for
tolerance in his address to the Italian Jurists
on December 6, 1953. Tolerance, however,
is the acceptance of a situation you cannot
alter. The argument over Church-State relations today concerns principles not situations. In recognition of this situation, Archbishop of Durban, Denis Hurley, an Oblate
of Mary Immaculate, has written an extremely interesting article appearing in the
initial issue of Continuum, a new periodical
sponsored by Saint Xavier College of Chicago, Illinois. Entitled "The Church-State
Dilemma," it sets forth an excellent analysis
of the present problem and poses a solution.
Archbishop Hurley observes that one can
understand the reason for the special present confusion in the political sphere. It
originates from the historic difficulty of distinguishing in the Christian prince between
his duties as a prince and his duties as a
Christian. This difficulty has been compounded by the tendency to imagine that
Church and State are concrete realities apart

from the human beings that constitute them.
As a result we have been striving to find
some point of contact betwen our objectivized Church and our objectivized State and
their respective powers.
We have in fact been looking for a pattern
of relations that will meet the following three
requirements: (1) Church and State must
be distinct; (2) The State must serve the
Church (in fulfillment of its religious obligation); and (3) The State must be independent of the Church.
Quite obviously it is impossible to reconcile (2) and (3). The State cannot be
obligated to serve the Church and yet remain independent of it. The semblance of
a solution is offered by distinguishing between the State's obligation to serve the
Church in the supernatural order and its
independence of the Church in the natural
order. But the question arises immediately:
how does the State, which by definition pertains to the natural order, get involved in the
supernatural order at all?
According to the Archbishop, -there seems
no way out of this impossible situation, so
the solution of the Church-State problem
must be sought elsewhere, and in what better
place than the Christian conscience? That
is where the supernatural and the natural
meet. The Christian conscience is the source
of Christian temporal action, political as
well as cultural and economic. Such action
is supernatural in its moral and personal
texture but remains on the natural plane in
its objective and technical performance. The
Church therefore has the right to address
herself to the conscience of the politician
but the technique of his trade is outside her
jurisdiction. His political morality is subject
to her guidance but not his political technique. That technique is intended for purely
temporal ends and he cannot be obliged to
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use it for religious purposes. In this sphere
he can and must maintain his lay autonomy.
Does this mean, asks Archbishop Hurley,
that there can be no co-operation between
Church and State in those famous mixed
matters that involve, for instance, the family
and education? Of course not. Though we
insist on the distinction of Church and State
we insist equally on the fact that the Church
and State meet in the Christian conscience
-in the Christian conscience of the bishop
who governs the Church and obeys the State,
in the Christian conscience of the politician
who governs the State and obeys the Church,
in the Christian conscience of the Christian
citizen who gives his loyalty and obedience
to both. Within this context there is ample
provision for the distinction of powers and
the collaboration of those who exercise
them.
There is, of course, also ample provision
for misunderstanding and contention. There
will be times when Church authority will see
a clear-cut moral issue where no such clearcut issue exists-as no doubt some of the
Italian hierarchy must have been tempted
to react in regard to the aperturaa sinistra.
There will also be times when politicians
will shrug off well-deserved reprimands for
political immorality with disparaging references to political priests. The frontier
between political morality and political
technique will not always be clearly demarcated. But the dialogue will go on and
yesterday's confusion will become tomorrow's platitude.
A valuable contribution to clearing the air
is being made by contemporary efforts to
reassess the Catholic position and in this
ecumenical age it will be a real achievement
if our reassessment enables us to look our
separated brother squarely in the eye and
not terrify him with that pair of thesis-

hypothesis horns inherited from the nineteenth century: "When I am weak I claim
freedom on your principles, when I am
strong I refuse it on my own."
There remains, however, according to
Archbishop Hurley, another pair of horns,
the horns of the dilemma of how you square
contemporary opinions with the traditional
teaching of the Church.
Sterilization
It is interesting to note that in face of
Justice Holmes' blistering denunciation of
the opponents of compulsory sterilization in
Buck v. Bell,' the last thirty years have seen
a change in scientific attitude on the subject
of sterilization and the position of the Justice
can no longer be vindicated even scientifically.
The Winter 1963 issue of The Indiana
Law Journal contains a most informative
note on the subject and stresses the fact
that even though the United States Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the substantive
law of sterilization, the contemporary question of the substantive constitutionality depends upon the continuing scientific validity
of the standards upon which the statutes are
based. Since most of the statutes are directed toward hereditary factors, the problem lies in the accurate determination of
what mental illnesses and mental deficiencies may be accurately classified as "hereditary."
During the first twenty years of this
century the theory of institutional care
grounded on the protection of the patient
from the dangers of society was abandoned.
It was replaced with the attitude that the
protection of society from the problems
caused by the mentally disordered should be
paramount in the institutionalization of
1274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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mentally ill and defective persons. This
change in attitude gave rise to several notions regarding mental health which gave
impetus to the eugenic movement. Institutional care became a means of segregating
persons from society and preventing them
from propagating. It became evident that
segregation as a eugenical means was unsatisfactory because the cost of institutionalizing all mentally ill and mentally deficient
persons would be economically unfeasible.
In addition it would seem questionable to
institutionalize a person simply to keep him
from propagating, when other factors did
not require such care.
Eugenic sterilization gained in importance
as a result of the change in the institutional
care theory and the economic unfeasibility
of segregation by institutionalization. With
its increasing use, however, many questions
were raised concerning the validity of heredity as a factor in mental illnesses and deficiencies, and in 1936 an extensive investigation was conducted by the American
Neurological Association under the leadership of Doctor Abraham Myerson. As a
result of this investigation the committee,
unable to absolutely relate hereditary factors
to mental illness and mental deficiency, recommended that sterilization only be performed in selected cases of certain diseases,
with the consent of the patient or those
responsible for him. The committee further
recommended: (1) that the laws should
be made voluntary rather than compulsory,
(2) that sterilization laws be made applicable not only to patients in state institutions, but to those in private institutions
and those at large in the community, and
(3) that a permanent committee be organized to conduct scientific research in the
field of mental disorders. Doctor Myerson
later commented that "the bulk of feeble-
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mindedness is utterly unknown as to genus,
pathology and disorders of physiology. 1
stress this because it is insufficient to say
'heredity' is a cause, since heredity is no
unified set of mechanisms."
Notwithstanding the early impetus toward
compulsory sterilizations, several factors
have played an important part in limiting
the application of such laws. First, in light
of the scientific knowledge gained from investigations, such as Doctor Myerson's, the
medical profession has re-evaluated its early
position concerning the importance of hereditary factors in mental disorders and has
adopted a new position in regard to eugenic
sterilization. The basic tenet in the adoption
of the new position is based on scientific
findings that not as many disorders are attributable to hereditary factors as was supposed in the infancy of the compulsory
sterilization movement. In addition to the
diminution of the hereditary factor as a
basis of mental illness and mental deficiencies, it has been determined that environment plays an important part in such disorders. In regard to the declining scientific
validity of heredity and the increasing concern about environment in sterilization, it
has been suggested that a hereditary-environmental basis for sterilization may be
stronger factually and, therefore, stronger
constitutionally, than the earlier over-emphasis on heredity as the causal factor in
mental illnesses and deficiencies.
According to the note in the Indiana Law
Journal the position for limiting the use of
eugenic sterilization has recently been affirmed in a report by a medical association
committee on mental health in South Dakota
which made the following statement conceming heredity in sterilization cases:
Medical science has by no means established that heredity is a factor in the devel-
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opment of mental diseases with the possible
exception of a very few and rare disorders.
The committee holds that the decision to
sterilize for whatever reason, should be left
up to the free decision reached by the
patient and family physician mutually and
that the state has no good reason to trespass
in this area.
The note concludes with the suggestion
that in view of (1) the changing attitude of
the medical profession as to the importance
of hereditary factors in mental disorders,
(2) the general attitude of both professional
and lay persons concerning the application
of eugenic sterilization statutes, (3) the
awareness of eugenists, themselves, as to
potential dangers of their theories, and (4)
in light of the fact that sterilization operations violate the bodily integrity of the person and are generally permanent in effect, a
careful evaluation of the standards upon
which sterilization is ordered must be made
in order to protect the rights of the person.
Privileged Communications

Readers of The Catholic Lawyer who
recall the article by Father LoGatto on
"Privileged Communications and the Social
Worker" which was featured in the Winter
1962 issue may be interested in a narrower
aspect of the subject currently featured in
the Winter 1963 issue of the Ohio State Law
Journal.
Writing on the topic "Confidential Communications to the Clergy," Dean Seward
Reese of the Willamette College of Law, in
commenting on the clergyman's privilege,
asks, among other questions, is "counseling"
included under the privilege? Also, he asks,
should the privilege be extended to admissions made in a church trial?
In discussing these, and related questions
in view of present-day priest-penitent statutes, Dean Reese asks further, is it necessary

to have a broad priest-penitent privilege?
About this, he answers, there should be little
doubt. It is needed by the clergyman, by
those individuals who require spiritual counsel or a process by which they can be relieved from a feeling of spiritual guilt, by
the church as an institution, by the trial
judge and by society.
Most clergy will not testify concerning
confidential communications regardless of
whether there is a statutory privilege. They
are bound by an overpowering discipline
that dictates the strictest standards of conduct concerning the maintenance of the inviolability of the confidential communication made to them in their ministerial capacity. This is just as true of most Protestant
clergy as it is of the Roman Catholic. Therefore, in a state without the privilege, a
clergyman facing contempt charges for refusing to testify would have little trouble
making the decision about what to do. He
would refuse, face contempt charges, and
imprisonment. The pressure from an institutional standpoint would reinforce his determination. To testify would cast doubt
upon the security all people have toward
the secrecy of confidential communications
to the clergy.
According to Dean Reese, today, the need
for the statute, and a broad one, is made
more manifest as a result of the development
within this century of a greater psychological understanding and analysis of the working of the human mind. This progressive
awareness is reflected in the more recent
statutes. As an example, the Massachusetts
statute enacted in 1962 in part states:
nor shall a priest, rabbi or ordained or
licensed minister of any church or an accredited Christian Science practitioner testify as to any communication made to him
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LAW AND MORALS
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a Catholic, to that conclusion. There are
philosophical arguments which lead me, as
a citizen, to the same conclusion. But neither
my theological nor my philosophical arguments lead me to the further conclusion that,
simply because artificial contraception is
morally wrong, therefore it should be penalized or prohibited by the state. I do not
support the Connecticut law, for instance,
which makes the actual use of a contraceptive a crime. For reasons which I cannot
recount in this brief article, it seems to me
that the use of a contraceptive device is a
matter of private morality, and not of public
morality. It seems to me, therefore, to be
beyond the proper competence of the police
power of the state. I do not speak of laws
which would prevent the public display of
contraceptive devices in store windows or
shop counters under the eyes of teen-agers.
I speak of the use of a contraceptive device.
Nevertheless, the use of public agencies
and of public funds to encourage and support artificial contraception is surely a different, although a related, problem. When
public authority and public funds are employed to encourage and support contraception, it seems to me that we are confronted

with a question of public morality. All citizens have an interest in the common good
of society, and therefore in public morality.
This interest is not to be destroyed or ignored because of religious belief or unbelief.
Wherefore citizens with religious beliefs
should not be disenfranchised or silenced
because their religious beliefs coincide, in
whole or in part, with their sincere civic
convictions as to what is good for the society
in which they live. When the Baptist or
Methodist or anyone else urges legal restrictions upon the use of alcoholic beverages or gambling, and does so because he
sincerely believes that such restrictions are
necessary or good for the common welfare
of civil society, he exercises a right and
fulfills an obligation of citizenship. It would
be stupidity or bigotry, it seems to me, to
accuse him of attempting to force his particular religion down the throats of others.
All citizens, of all faiths and of no faith,
have the civic interest and the civic obligation to speak out and to work for the common good, including the public morality, of
the nation and the state. I suggest that the
distinction between purely private morality
and public morality, outlined above, may be
of some help in clarifying the issues which
divide us.

PUBLICATIONS
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by any person in seeking religious or spiritual advice or comfort, or as to his advice
given thereon in the course of his professional duties or in his professional character,
without the consent of such person.

would be modern and acceptable to state
legislatures; and (2) That the drafting committee be composed of 15 men to be chosen
as follows: (a) Seven experienced legislative draftsmen: The man most responsible
for the drafting of the priest-penitent statutes in each of the following states: Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia,
(b) Four clergymen from major churches,
(c) A trial judge, (d) Two legal educators,
and (e) A teacher from a theological school.

Dean Reese concludes his article by recommending: (1) That some national organization of attorneys sponsor the drafting of
a uniform statute covering privileged confidential communications to clergymen that

